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Value neutralityThe United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is being used to argue for wider
recognition of the legal capacity of peoplewithmental disabilities. This raises a question about the implications of
the Convention for attributions of criminal responsibility. The present paper works towards an answer by
analysing the relationship between legal capacity in relation to personal decisions and criminal acts. Its central
argument is that because moral and political considerations play an essential role in setting the relevant stan-
dards, legal capacity in the context of personal decisions and criminal acts should not be thought of as two
sides of the same coin. The implications of particular moral or political norms are likely to be different in these
two legal contexts, and this may justify asymmetries in the relevant standards for legal capacity. However, the
analysis highlights a fundamental question about how much weight moral or political considerations should
be given in setting these standards, and this is used to frame a challenge to those calling for signiﬁcantly wider
recognition of the legal capacity of people with mental disabilities on the basis of the Convention.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1 Asdescribed by theCommittee on theRights of PersonswithDisabilities, “Legal capac-
ity is the ability to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise these rights and1. Introduction
Developments in international law in connection with the United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) have
called for wider recognition of the legal capacity of peoplewithmental dis-
abilities. Standard interpretations of the concept “legal capacity”hold that it
refers to being a duty bearer aswell as a rights holder, encompassing recog-
nition before the law in a broad sense. In keeping with this interpretation,
the call for wider legal recognition has been said to apply not only in the
context of personal decisions but also in the context of responsibility for
criminal acts. This line of thinking assumes that these two kinds of legal ca-
pacity are two sides of the same coin: that a need for wider recognition in
the personal sphere automaticallymeans that there is a need forwider rec-
ognition in the criminal sphere.
It is argued here that this assumption should be resisted. The essen-
tial role played by moral and political norms in shaping the relevant
standards provides a reason against thinking of legal capacity as a single
attribution across legal contexts. Particular moral or political consider-
ations may have different implications in different parts of the law,
and this seems likely to justify asymmetries in standards for legal capac-
ity across one legal system. In establishing the implications of the Con-
vention for criminal responsibility one crucial question therefore
concerns the implications of the evaluative commitments underlying
the CRPD in this particular legal context.. This is an open access article underA further, more fundamental question concerns howmuch of a role
moral and political norms should be given in setting any standard for
legal capacity. The relevance of such considerations for questions of
legal capacity is an underlying theme that runs through the paper. It is
used, ultimately, to frame a challenge to those endorsing “strong” inter-
pretations of the Convention, which call for signiﬁcantly wider recogni-
tion of the legal capacity of people with mental disabilities.
2. Article 12 and legal capacity
Recent developments in international human rights law have called
into question the legitimacy of the current link between mental and
legal capacity.1 At the centre of these developments, Article 12 of the
CRPD requires that legal capacity should not be limited on the basis of
mental disability: persons withmental disabilities, includingmental dis-
orders,must be recognized as persons before the lawon an equal basis to
others and must be supported in the exercise of their legal capacity.2
The crucial aspect of Article 12, where much of the academic discus-
sion so far has focused, concerns legal capacity in the sense of the right
to make one's own personal decisions. While Article 12 has been
interpreted in stronger and weaker ways, it is generally understoodduties (legal agency)” (2014, para. 13).
2 TheUnitedNations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted
by the UN General Assembly in December 2006 and came into force in May 2008;
Ibid, para. 25.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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people with mental disabilities more widely than is currently the
case.3 Strong interpretations suggest that Article 12 leaves very limited
room for restricting legal capacity on the basis of mental incapacity.4
Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner have proposed that the mental require-
ment for the right to self-determination in one's private affairs should
be an ability to express an intention (Bach, 2009; Bach & Kerzner,
2010).5 Weaker interpretations hold that the CRPD requires a shift
to at least some extent from substituted to supported decisions
(Richardson, 2012; Slobogin, 2015).6 Therefore, to a lesser or greater de-
gree most interpretations understand the Convention as requiring a
lowering of current mental thresholds for legal capacity in the personal
sphere, to enable this shift to occur.7
However, such calls have been understood to also apply in criminal
law, raising a question about the implications of the CRPD for defences
that are based on mental incapacities.8 Criminal law operates on a pre-
sumption that the capacity for crime is present, but this can be displaced
if the defendant is under a certain age; or if theymeet the requirements
of a mental incapacity based-defence (Loughnan, 2011; Peay, 2011a,
p. 3). The broad thrust of interpretations of Article 12 can be character-
ized as the idea that, like everyone else, people with mental disabilities
should be free to make their ownmistakes, which should be recognized
as such; and this idea could plausibly be applied to questions of criminal
responsibility.9 In 2009 theUnitedNationsHighCommissioner reported3 Peter Bartlett writes that, “To what extent the concept of mental capacity can still be
used” is an “open question” in the interpretation of the Convention (Bartlett, 2012,
pp. 761–762).
Wayne Martin and colleagues argue that the functional test of the Mental Capacity Act
2005 in England and Wales, as written rather than as applied in practice, is compatible
with the CRPD. However, they note that this interpretation is explicitly rejected by the
CRPD Committee (Martin, Michalowski, Jütten, & Burch, 2014).
4 For example, the CRPDCommittee's General Comment on Article 12 states: “Article 12
of the Convention afﬁrms that all persons with disabilities have full legal capacity.” (para.
8) “Under Article 12 of the Convention, perceived or actual deﬁcits in mental capacity
must not be used as justiﬁcation for denying legal capacity.” Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (2014, para. 13).
A discussion paper by Lucy Series and colleagues explains that, “The aim of the GC in this
area is to ensure that legal capacity is de-coupled from prejudicial perceptions of an
individual's ‘mental capacity.’ It seeks to ensure that regardless of an individual's level of
decision- making skills, she or he is still respected as a person before the law and a legal
agent. If intervention in legal decision-making does occur, it must be based on factors that
all individuals could be subject to, notmerely peoplewho have a cognitive disability or are
perceived as lacking decision-making skills.” (Series, Arstein-Kerslake, Gooding, & Flynn,
2005, p. 5) For a critique of such interpretations see John Dawson's contribution to this
journal issue (Dawson, 2015).
5 This is a much less demanding standard than those currently used in many jurisdic-
tions, which require abilities to do with understanding, appreciating, using and weighing
relevant information. Commenting on such “functional” tests, Bach and Kerzner write, “To
make recognition of legal capacity dependent on a particular set of decision-making skills,
as most current capacity assessments do, is to import ableist assumptions about what the
demonstration of decision-making ability entails.” (Bach & Kerzner, 2010, p. 66).
6 In this journal issue, Christopher Slobogin discusses his “basic rationality and basic
self-regard” test which in his view constitutes a “narrow deﬁnition of competency”
(Slobogin, 2015, p. 40). However, he recognizes that this may not be considered compat-
ible with the CRPD on certain interpretations.
Also in this journal issue, Bernadette McSherry and Kay Wilson argue for a moderate po-
sition, calling for a shift of focus fromnegative rights to positive rights and the provision of
supportmechanisms: “the CRPD highlights that theremay be amidway point between in-
voluntary treatment on the one hand and no treatment at all on the other” (McSherry &
Wilson, 2015, p. 68).
7 The exception would be interpretations that resist any shift from substituted to sup-
ported decision-making beyond cases where support enables the person with a disability
to satisfy an existing mental capacity requirement.
8 Michael Bachwrites that having legal capacity includes being “held legally responsible
and liable for one's actions in contract, tort, property and criminal law”; that is “to be one
to whom legal responsibilities attach.” (Bach, 2009, p. 3).
A further issue not addressed in this paper concerns unﬁtness to plead. For an in depth
discussion in the context of Australian commonwealth law see: Australian Law Reform
Commission (2014). See Jill Peay's contribution to this journal issue for an English Law
perspective (Peay, 2015).
9 Throughout the paper I am using the phrase “recognition as a legal agent” to refer to
both elements of legal capacity as described by the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (2014). See footnote 1.that the CRPD requires replacing criminal defences that are based on
“mental or intellectual disability” with “disability-neutral” doctrines
(2009, para. 47), and this has been taken to indicate that defences
such as insanity and diminished responsibility may be in violation of
the Convention (Bartlett, 2012; Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2014;
Slobogin, 2015).10
The central aim of this paper is to address a theoretical question
about the relationship between legal capacity in these two contexts, in
order to address a practical question about the implications of the
CRPD for law concerning criminal responsibility. The paper begins by
outlining the moral arguments that are given within the CRPD litera-
ture, for wider recognition of legal capacity in the personal sphere;
and considering whether these prima facie apply in questions of crimi-
nal responsibility. The arguments present in the literature roughly fall
into three categories that I will refer to as “personhood”, “growth and
ﬂourishing” and “limited understanding” arguments, which will be
discussed in turn.3. Personhood arguments
Prominent among the reasons that are given forwider recognition of
legal capacity in the personal sphere is the idea that restricting legal ca-
pacity on the basis of mental incapacity involves a failure to properly
recognize the individual as a human being (Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake,
2014).11 It is argued that people with mental disabilities must be seen
asmoral subjects rather than as objects to be cared for—that they should
be attributed full moral agency rather than being seen as passive recip-
ients of care.12 And the importance of this kind of recognition is often
justiﬁed with reference to the idea that this is essential for meaningful
participation in society.13
Independent of the CRPD, Martha Nussbaum has made the case for
there being a vital linkbetween civil rights and the recognition of people
with mental disabilities as citizens with equal human dignity
(Nussbaum, 2009). However, as Nussbaum points out, different civil
rights seem connected to the notion of equal human dignity to varying10 For anexaminationof this question in the context of English law see: Peay (2015). Peay
notes that on issues of mental capacity in criminal law the CRPD and the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are driving in opposing directions. She argues that—
apparentlymindful of the ECHR—the Law Commission's recent recommendation that men-
tal capacity be adopted as the concept underpinning the insanity defence, would “[arguably
offer]more protection from criminal liability to thosewith a disability; but itwould arguably
also bring the law into greater conﬂict with the CRPD.” (p. 26).
Also in this journal issue, Alec Buchanan critiques the LawCommission's recommendation
for a mental capacity-based insanity defence: (Buchanan, 2015)
Bach and Kerzner recommend that, “legal responsibility can only be diminished where a
person lacked the requisite decision-making capability when carrying out actions which
are now the focus of civil or criminal proceedings. Decision-making capability would then
have three main components: a) decision-making abilities that meet the minimum
threshold as deﬁned above; b) needed decision-making supports…; and c) reasonable ac-
commodation on the part of others in the decision-making process (i.e. the goods and
services).” (Bach & Kerzner, 2010, p. 71).
However, Bach elsewhere suggests that incapacity-based criminal defences are not prob-
lematic in the way that incapacity-based standards used to override the right to make
one's own choices are: “one of the ‘bases’ on which non-disabled ‘others’ enjoy legal ca-
pacity, is precisely their right to invoke incapacity, as temporary or as long term as itmight
be, as a defence in contract, tort and criminal law. It would be difﬁcult to argue that this
right to invoke incapacity, as a basis onwhich ‘non-disabled others’ exercise legal capacity,
is a violation of Article 12. Such a defence is foundational to contract, tort and criminal
law.” (Bach, 2009, p. 5).
11 From the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: “Legal capacity means
that all people, including persons with disabilities, have legal standing and legal agency
simply by virtue of being human” (2014, para. 12).
12 For example: “personswith disabilities are ‘subjects’ and not ‘objects’—sentient beings
like all others deserving equal respect and equal enjoyment of their rights.” (Quinn, 2010).
13 Again from the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: “[Legal capacity]
is the key to accessing meaningful participation in society.” (2014, para. 13).
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recognition of equal human dignity can only be achieved through an
equal capability.14 For example, to “give some groups of people unequal
voting rights, or unequal religious liberty, is to set them up in a position
of subordination and indignity vis-à-vis others. It is to fail to recognize
their equal human dignity.” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 336).15 In other do-
mains she argues that it seems that equal human dignity is recognized
so long as the relevant capability is “adequately secured” (Nussbaum,
2009, p. 336). Here Nussbaum gives the example of housing, holding
that the notion of equal human dignity does not seem to require equal
house size beyond a particular threshold. She proposes that domains
such as education and basic health care pose more challenging ques-
tions about when inequality undermines recognition of equal human
dignity, suggesting that in these areas, “adequacy does appear to require
something close to [equal access]” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 337).16
Understood against this theoretical background, the personhood ar-
guments in connection with CRPD raise a question about the relation-
ship between self-determination in one's personal affairs, and the
recognition of equal human dignity.17 Like voting, the liberty to make
one's own decisions surely has an intimate connection with respect
for equal human dignity. But unlike voting, personal decisions can di-
rectly undermine other capabilities that are also connected to human
dignity. In this way, it might be argued that the recognition of equal
human dignity may sometimes require limits on the right to self-
determination.18 Nonetheless, Nussbaum's theoretical framework pro-
vides one way of grounding and exploring the personhood arguments
for greater recognition of legal capacity in the personal sphere.19
The question to be considered here is could these personhood argu-
ments equally be made in relation to criminal responsibility? Tina
Minkowitz suggests such an argument when she claims that mental
disability-based criminal defences involve seeing “persons with disabil-
ities, particularly psychosocial disabilities… as less than moral equals
with other persons.” (Minkowitz, 2014, p. 3) And philosophical ac-
counts ofwhat itmeans towithhold responsibility on such grounds sug-
gest that thismay be true at least according to prominent contemporary
views. Such accounts offer explanations of what properties of persons
make them appropriate targets for blame, and one increasingly inﬂuen-
tial view holds that a person is blameworthy if their action, or inaction,
reﬂects their rational judgments or normative commitments (Lacey,
2010; Morse, 1999; Smith, 2008; Watson, 1996). Understood in this
way, the attribution of responsibility regards the person as answerable
for what they have done.2014 Here a “capability” refers to a real opportunity—an ability in a much broader sense
than a mental capacity.
15 How equal capability is achieved for people with profound mental impairments re-
mains a further question. For discussion in the context of voting see: Wasserman &
McMahan (2012).
16 Posing a related balancing question directly in response to the CRPD, in this journal is-
sue Dawson suggests that involuntary treatment might in fact promote social inclusion:
“Involuntary psychiatric treatment, for instance, could both limit a person's autonomy
and promote their social inclusion, health, and standard of living. Would it therefore
violate or promote the person's rights under the Convention as a whole?” (Dawson,
2015, p. 71).
17 For example, Nussbaum claims that, “Jury service is a recognized hallmark of fully
equal citizenship, exclusion formwhich is stigmatizing… it is… a badge of civic equality.”
(Nussbaum, 2009, p. 349).
18 The arguments for greater recognition of legal capacity in the sphere of personal deci-
sionswon't be examined in detail here as the aim of the paper is limited to exploring their
applicability to questions of legal capacity in relation to criminal acts.
19 I note, however, that Bach and Kerzner have been critical of Nussbaum's approach to
mental disability (Bach & Kerzner, 2010, pp. 69–72).
20 By way of contrast, a consequentialist account according to which holding others re-
sponsible serves only to inﬂuence behaviour, suggests that withholding responsibility
on the basis of mental incapacity entails only that the person is unable to change (Duff,
1986, pp. 42-54; Smart, 1961). Given that we often attribute an inability to change to
others, from a consequentialist perspective withholding responsibility does not seem to
involve awithdrawal of recognition as a human being.Most contemporary theorists, how-
ever, hold that there ismore to attributions of responsibility than just this consequentialist
element.On the basis of one such view, Angela Smith has argued that with-
holding responsibility is “in effect, to say that [the person] is not to be
regarded as someone to be reasoned with, but merely as someone to
be understood, treated, managed, or controlled. It is to regard a person
as we would regard a vicious dog or a bratty toddler … not someone
with whom it is possible to enter into relationships of mutual respect
and recognition” (Smith, 2008, p. 389).21 On the more narrow issue of
withholding criminal responsibility, Antony Duff holds that this entails
that the individual is incapable of reasoning to the degree that “we can-
not address them as fellow participants” in the relevant legal practices
(Duff, 2005, p. 450).
A similar understanding of what it means to withhold criminal re-
sponsibility is found in discussions of speciﬁc defences. John Gardner
has explored the meaning of the defence of diminished responsibility
in his reﬂections on why, intuitively, someone who suffers domestic
abuse and kills their abuser should prefer a ﬁnding of provocation to di-
minished responsibility, despite the fact that both would reduce a
charge of murder to manslaughter. He suggests that by making use of
the defence of diminished responsibility the defendant opts for a non-
rational explanation of the behaviour and thereby “demeans herself as
a rational being”. In his view, a successful defence amounts to seeing
the person as “someone who can't explain herself rationally, someone
… whose participation in the human good is diminished” (Gardner,
2007, pp. 180–181).22
Such accounts suggest that withholding criminal responsibility on
the basis ofmental incapacity does involve a particular kind of social ex-
clusion, and at least a partial withdrawal of the recognition that we nor-
mally extend to others. On this basis, the personhood arguments that
are given as a reason for wider recognition of legal capacity in the per-
sonal sphere do seem relevant to incapacity-based criminal defences.
In this way, a case could be made that defences such as insanity and di-
minished responsibility do undermine the recognition of personhood,
and that this provides a reason to adopt minimal mental requirements
for criminal responsibility.234. Personal growth and ﬂourishing arguments
A second set of arguments for wider legal recognition of people with
mental disabilities in the personal spheremore directly concerns conse-
quences. According to these arguments, allowing people with mental
disabilities to make their own decisions will enable their personal
growth and the development of capacities for ﬂourishing (Bach, 2009;
Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2014; Quinn, 2010).24 These are empirical
claims, and they will remain speculative until the policies in question
are put in place. Nevertheless, it seems a plausible hypothesis that
many people with mental disabilities could be helped to develop and21 Smith holds, therefore, that responsibility should bewithheld only in the rarest of cir-
cumstances. She nonetheless suggests that having a “transientmental illness” could count
as a circumstancewhere withholding responsibility is appropriate, on grounds that an act
committed as a result of a delusional state, for example, cannot be said to reﬂect the
person's judgements.
22 In this journal issue Slobogin argues that, “Compared to an acquittal “by reason of
inanity,” an acquittal on lack-of-intent, self-defense of duress grounds is far less
tarnishing.” (Slobogin, 2015, p. 39).
23 Itmay be the case that themental requirements for criminal responsibility are in prac-
tice already minimal relative to standards for legal capacity in relation to personal deci-
sions. As discussed later in the paper, this is the currently case in English law concerning
children. In this journal issue, Hanna Pickard claims that this is also true of the current ap-
proach to personality disorder in English law (Pickard, 2015).
24 For example, Minkowitz writes, “Crises of self are not merely distressing; they can be
valuable opportunities that push us to go beyond old assumptions and habits. In
attempting to protect oneself or another person from risks we can inadvertently domore
harm than good—not only the deprivation of opportunities for growth but also the harm
done to the personality by such deprivation, which can lead to destructive consequences.”
(Minkowitz, 2014, p. 2).
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of lowering current mental thresholds for legal capacity in the personal
sphere).25 The developmental importance of making one's own choices
is widely recognized, an obvious example being the role that self-
determination is thought to play in development of personal autonomy
through childhood and early adulthood. Common sense says that young
people must be allowed to exercise their developing agency, exposing
them, necessarily, to certain risks involved.26
Transferred to the sphere of criminal law, the idea would be that
assigning criminal responsibility also plays a role in personal develop-
ment. Duff suggests that it is unlikely that criminal law has a single pur-
pose (Duff, 2011). However, censure is a prominent function of criminal
justice systems, and perhaps in connection with this element consider-
ations of personal development are found in English and American law
at least as far back as the early 19th century.27 At that time a strict im-
posing of liabilitywas understood to serve a character building function,
“teaching deﬁcient individuals how to become responsible subjects”
(Blumenthal, 2007, p. 1158). A similar perspective is found today in
the justiﬁcations sometimes given for holding children criminally re-
sponsible (for discussion see: Keating, 2007).
The crucial issue for the purpose of this paper is whether these ideas
about what the assigning of criminal responsibility might achieve for
someone with a mental disability, will be borne out. In practice, within
current legal systems the question iswhich of two paths ismost likely to
promote this developmental end: punishment, possibly prison, and a
criminal record; or diversion out of the criminal justice system, and
treatment, possibly involving a hospital disposal? It would seem that
the answer depends enormously on the resources that are available
along both paths. However, my tentative hypothesis is that we should
be sceptical about there being a greater opportunity for growth and de-
velopment through the criminal justice system; more sceptical, at
least, than about the possibilities for growth and development through
recognizing legal capacity in the context of personal decisions.28
One reason for skepticism is there being fewer opportunities for sup-
ported decision-making in this context given that many crimes are
spontaneous.29
These are ultimately questions that await further investigation.
However, at least in the context of existing Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions, arguments based on personal growth and ﬂourishing as an
outcome of recognizing legal capacity transfer less well to the sphere
of criminal responsibility than personhood arguments. This
identiﬁes one way that a proponent of wider recognition of legal
capacity in the context of personal decisions might resist the corol-
lary that an equivalent approach should be adopted in questions of
criminal responsibility. The claim would be that while personhood
arguments may provide a reason to pursue greater recognition in
this context, personal growth arguments do not. The question then
becomes one about the relative importance of the “personhood”
and “personal growth” considerations.25 A trial of a supported decision-making in the state of South Australia provides some
preliminary evidence for the possibilities in terms of personal growth as a result of a shift
from guardianship to a supported decision-making structure (Wallace, 2012).
26 However, this intuition only goes so far. In the context of capacities forﬁnancial auton-
omy, for example, it is within the realms of pocket money and odd jobs that a young
person's ﬁnancial autonomy is enabled and developed. It would be against common sense
to allow a 7-year-old to have a credit card with a standard limit. Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunsteinmake a similar point when they agree that as a general principle, “it is sometimes
helpful for us to make mistakes, for this is how we learn”, but that, “[we] do not believe
that children should learn the dangers of pools by falling in a hoping for the best.”
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, pp. 240-241).
27 It would seem that part of the purpose of censure is to engage with the person as a
moral agent, in a developmental way. Thanks to Matt Matravers for this point.
28 In this journal issue Peay also discusses the balancing of these kinds of considerations
(Peay, 2015).
29 Thanks to Jonathan Herring for making this point.5. Limited understanding arguments
A third kind of argument present in the literature is based on devel-
opments in the understanding of human decision-making, and a claim
about how limited this understanding still is. Eilionoir Flynn and Anna
Arstein-Kerslake point to recent developments in psychology that
have emphasized the importance of emotional and intuitive mental
processes in decision-making, which in their view call standard func-
tional tests into question because of their focus on “cognition and ratio-
nality” (Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2014, p. 82).30 Flynn and Arstein-
Kerslake argue that given these developments and the likelihood that
we still have much to learn, in the sphere of personal decisions the
law should err on the side of respecting legal capacity. The error that
we should try to avoid is denying legal capacity when someone may
in fact be in a position tomake their own choices, and this is said to pro-
vide a reason for wider recognition of legal capacity in this context.
The arguments concerning what the scientiﬁc developments mean
for current legal capacity standards are yet to be fully articulated and
explored,31 but it is clear that our understanding of human decision-
making is currently limited. This concern straightforwardly applies to
current functional tests in any legal context. However, different conclu-
sionsmaywell be drawn aboutwhat our response should be in the con-
text of different legal questions. In law concerning personal decisions, a
choice must be made between prioritizing liberty by recognizing legal
capacity, or protecting well-being. But in law concerning criminal re-
sponsibility there is a different choice to be made. In this context, by
erring on the side of recognizing legal capacity one avoids the risk of ex-
cusing someone and diverting them out of the criminal justice system
(or holding them responsible for a less serious offence) when they
should in fact be held fully responsible. The risk that is preferred is the
punishment of peoplewho should bediverted out of the criminal justice
system.32 Whether this seems like the right risk to choose rests on a
judgement about the relative seriousness of these outcomes.
What becomes apparent is that this third kind of argument depends
on moral considerations such as those identiﬁed in the previous two
sections: issues such as the importance of recognition as an agent in
the context of criminal acts, and the likelihood and importance of pro-
moting personal development through the assigning of responsibility.
On its own, our limited understanding of human decision-making
does not adjudicate either way on the question of whether there should
be wider recognition of legal capacity—either in relation to personal de-
cisions or criminal acts.6. Interim conclusions
The foregoing overview of the moral arguments for wider recogni-
tion of legal capacity present in literature connected to the CRPD sug-
gests that the three kinds of argument identiﬁed apply to questions of
criminal responsibility to varying degrees. Personhood considerations
arguably provide a reason to endorse minimal mental requirements
for criminal responsibility. However, the implications of arguments
concerning personal growth and ﬂourishing are more uncertain. Propo-
nents hold that wider recognition of legal capacity in the personal
sphere will facilitate the personal growth and ﬂourishing of people30 This concern seems to resonate with the position of the Committee on the Rights of
Personswith Disabilities, when they state that the “functional approach [where a person's
decision-making skills are considered to be deﬁcient] isﬂawed for two key reasons.… The
second is that it presumes to be able to accurately assess the inner-workings of the human
mind” (2014, para. 13).
Seeminglymaking a related point, GerardQuinn speaks of “the enthronement of rational-
ity as the touchstone of humanity” which “needs to be closely interrogated since most of
us do not actually function rationally.” (Quinn, 2010, p.21).
31 For one interpretation of these arguments see: Craigie & Bortolotti (2014, 398-404).
32 This approach to framing the question is adapted from Allen Buchanan and Dan
Brock's approach to framing the questions of competence in personal decisions
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989).
36 It is widely accepted in legal theory that criminal responsibility requires certain men-
tal abilities (for an analysis of this issue see: Loughnan, 2012). The practice of not holding
infants and people with mental disorders responsible is said to reveal a capacity require-
ment as a prerequisite for criminal responsibility, and according to Antony Duff this re-
quirement is the capacity to be reasons responsive, at least to the relevant reasons (Duff,
1986). Being “reasons responsive”might be given as one account of what it is to be self-
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greater recognition of legal capacity in questions of criminal responsibil-
ity. Among the reasons for this conclusion, there seems to be much less
opportunity for supported decision-making in this context. Develop-
mental considerations therefore offer one way that a proponent of
wider recognition of legal capacity in the sphere of personal decisions
might resist endorsing an equivalent position in relation to standards
for legal capacity in the context of criminal acts.
The third kind of argument that was identiﬁed concerns the signiﬁ-
cance of our still limited understanding of human decision-making. The
moral question that arises is, given the uncertainty in this area, how
should lawmakers respond? It was argued that the answer may well be
different in the context of personal decisions and criminal acts, because
of the different evaluative issues at stake. While decisions about where
to set the mental threshold for the right to make one's own decisions
must balance the value of liberty and recognition against the protection
of well-being, the equivalent question in relation to criminal responsibil-
ity involves weighing the importance of punishment and holding others
to account, against welfare considerations. This third category of argu-
ment therefore potentially offers another source of reasons against the
wider recognition of legal capacity in questions of criminal responsibility.
A broader implication of the above analysis is that it suggests there
may be strongmoral reasons not to think of legal capacity in a singular,
decontextualized way: it may well be appropriate to adopt different
standards for legal capacity in different areas of law, on the basis that
there are different moral and political considerations in play. This raises
a question about why legal capacity is being understood in a singular
way in the CRPD literature, such that claims about legal capacity in the
context of personal decisions are assumed to automatically apply to
questions of legal capacity in the context of criminal acts.
Onemotivating concernmay be about the fairness of oneperson, at a
single point in time, being recognized as having legal capacity in one
context but not another.33 In relation to the implementation of the
CRPD the speciﬁc concern would be that adults with mental disabilities
might be recognized as legal agents in their personal decisions, but not
in relation to criminal acts. One place in English law where there is a
clear asymmetry in the assigning of legal capacity between personal de-
cisions and criminal acts, and where concerns about this have been
raised, is in law concerning young people. In England andWales, a per-
son is held fully criminally responsible at age 10, but it is not until age 18
that they gain the full legal capacity to make their own treatment
decisions.34 The asymmetry here is the converse of the situation just
considered in relation to adults with mental disabilities—a 10-year-old
is recognized as a full legal agent in relation to criminal responsibility
but not treatment choices. Nonetheless, this situation in existing law
provides a startingpoint for considering the general issue of asymmetry.
7. An argument for uniformity
In a critique of this state of affairs for young people, Barry Lyons has
argued that there should be a strong presumption in favour of uniformi-
ty in these attributions of legal capacity (Lyons, 2010).35 His argument33 Pickard very effectively makes this point using a hypothetical story about P: “P's story
sharply highlights the tension in how people with personality disorder are treated at the
hands of criminal and civil lawbecause hismental state at one and the same time is deemed
to meet the conditions required for criminal responsibility, and to warrant involuntary
hospital admission. … There are no doubt many ways we might attempt to reconcile
and rationalize P's treatment by criminal and civil law respectively. But it is nonetheless
difﬁcult not to feel, at heart, that P gets a raw deal. For, whichever way he turns, he is sub-
jected to the strong arm of the law—deemed sufﬁciently mentally well to be punished for
his crimes, but not deemed sufﬁciently mentally well to retain the right to make his own
decisions about matters of serious importance to his own life, including whether or not to
continue it.” (Pickard, 2015, p. 16; see also: Peay, 2011b).
34 Consent at age 16 and refusal at age 18.
35 In his analysis Lyons compares decisions that involve death as a consequence—life-
ending treatment refusals and killings—in order to hold this element constant across the
two contexts.rests on a parallel that he draws between the mental abilities that
are presumed necessary for these two kinds of legal capacity. Broadly
in keeping with criminal jurisprudence,36 Lyons holds that as a gen-
eral principle it is, “unfair to ascribe [criminal] responsibility to indi-
viduals who were not capable of self government”, and therefore
that ascriptions of responsibility assume that the person in question
is capable of self-government (Lyons, 2010, p. 273).37 He further ar-
gues that self-government in this context involves essentially the
samemental functions as self-government in the context of personal
decisions—an ability to weigh up options with reference to a set of
values, and to understand the consequences of choices and actions
—and that the decisions in question can be equivalently difﬁcult
and complex.38
On the basis of these parallels, Lyons recommends either that if “chil-
dren are to be held accountable by the criminal justice system then it
seems that we should recognise their capacity to make their own
healthcare decisions”; otherwise, if the law does not allow children to
make their own healthcare decisions, “the criminal justice system
would seem to have little entitlement to hold them responsible for
acts that transgress the criminal law.” (Lyons, 2010, p. 278).39 Crucially,
Lyons explains the asymmetry in existing law in terms of the pursuit of
different ends. According to Lyons, in the medical context the law aims
to preserve the lives of young people by denying them the right to re-
fuse life-saving treatment, resulting in a high age threshold for full
legal capacity; while in the criminal context a desire to hold children re-
sponsible results in a much lower age threshold for legal capacity
(Lyons, 2010, pp. 277–278).40 In his view, the role played by these con-
siderations constitutes a “manipulation” of the relevant standards
(Lyons, 2010, p. 278)—a claim that seems to imply that it is inappropri-
ate formoral or political considerations to play a role in setting these re-
quirements for legal capacity.
What'smissing in this picture is that even a complete understanding
of the mental functions that are engaged in the relevant decisions and
actions would not answer the question of what the legal standards
should be. This is a necessarily normative question, in part because for
any mental function that is implicated, there remains a question about
how much functioning is necessary for the recognition of legal capacity
in the relevant domain. It is increasingly recognized that autonomy
(or self-governance) in this psychological sense comes in degrees, and
that we can all be helped to be more autonomous in our personal deci-
sions (Craigie & Bortolotti, 2015; Maclean, 2006; O'Neill, 2002; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2009). It seems that there is no natural threshold for the legal
standard (for discussion in relation to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in
England and Wales see: Richardson, 2012, 2013). Rather, the boundary
between mental capacity and incapacity in the private sphere is drawngoverning. However ﬂeshing self-government out in this way exposes the possibility that
there may be different relevant reasons in these two legal contexts. The relevant reasons
may be “internal” reasons in the personal context, and “external” reasons in the criminal
context, and this could be used to argue that there may be different psychological mech-
anisms in play (Craigie & Coram, 2013). This possibility is discussed brieﬂy towards the
end of this paper.
37 Lyons also cites a number of legal principles in support his presumption in favour of
uniformity: a principle set out in the Beijing Rules according to which the burden of the
criminal responsibility requires that the individual is able to claim correlative legal rights;
and the United Nations StandardMinimumRules of the Administration of Juvenile Justice
(Lyons, 2010).
38 This assumption will be examined below.
39 Gerben Meyen has also argued for a more uniﬁed approach to legal capacity in these
two contexts (Meynen, 2009, 2010).
40 I assume, as Lyons does, that the age threshold is at least in part justiﬁed in terms of
mental abilities, with psychological development normally increasing with age.
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value of liberty, well-being and life (Buchanan, 2004).41 These consider-
ations shapewhat is consideredminimally necessary in terms ofmental
functioning for the legal capacity to make one's own personal decisions.
As a result, different societies, or the one society at different times, will
draw this line in different places on the basis of divergent evaluative
commitments.
For the same reason it also seems that one society at a single point in
time may be justiﬁed in adopting different standards for legal capacity in
different parts of the law. In relation to law concerning children, this is a
possibility that has been raised by Heather Keating. Keating argues that
questions of where to set the age thresholds for criminal liability and
self-determination are not purely developmental matters—rather, they
are policy decisions which are therefore “shaped in part … by political
considerations.” (Keating, 2007, p. 191). On this basis, Keating frames
the question about whether an asymmetry between these thresholds is
justiﬁed, as one about whether the political purposes of the two legal
standards are sufﬁciently different to justify the discrepancy.
However, Keating also points to a further question concerning the ap-
propriate extent of the role for political considerations in setting these
standards. Even if one thinks that the political considerations are very dif-
ferent between these two legal contexts and that they justify an asymme-
try, there remains a question about how much of a role any moral or
political consideration should play in determining these standards. In
Keating's view, the current age threshold for criminal responsibility has
been shaped to too great a degree by the punitive aims of the criminal
law, while too little consideration has been given to a 10-year-old's psy-
chological limitations. In effect, the balance between these two kinds of
consideration—what I will call “evaluative” and “psychological” consider-
ations—is unjust.42 Applying this approach to law concerning adults, and
adopting the plausible assumption that there is considerable overlap in
the psychological functions engaged in personal decisions and criminal
acts, only a limited degree of asymmetry between standards for legal ca-
pacity in relation to personal decisions and criminal acts will be justiﬁed.
This account of the proper relationship between evaluative and psy-
chological factors in questions of legal capacity brings a central feature
of the developments around the CRPD into focus. Those adopting strong
interpretations of Article 12—calling for much wider recognition of the
legal capacity of persons with disabilities—implicitly reject this account,
holding instead that evaluative considerations should be given much
more weight than psychological considerations. Since the arguments
for uniformity are based on psychological considerations, they appear
to have little bearing on this kind position. The relationship between
evaluative and psychological considerations that is implicit in the stron-
gest interpretations of Article 12 allows for virtually any degree of asym-
metry between standards for legal capacity in different parts of the law,
so long as the difference is justiﬁed inmoral or political terms. Moral ar-
guments referring to, for example, personhood or personal develop-
ment might be still given against a particular asymmetry in legal
capacity (this possibility is considered in the ﬁnal section of the
paper). However, the asymmetry under consideration here is a person
having legal capacity in relation to personal decisions but not criminal
acts, and at least intuitively, this appears less morally problematic
than the converse situation for children in English law.41 I take this to be the point made by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities when theywrite: “The concept of mental capacity… is not, as it is commonly pre-
sented, an objective, scientiﬁc and naturally occurring phenomenon. Mental capacity is
contingent on social and political contexts, as are the disciplines, professions and practices
which play a dominant role in assessing mental capacity.” (2014, para. 12).
42 Extreme exampleswould be assigning responsibility to a three-year-old, or not giving
legal standing to an adult on grounds of gender or race. Here the legal standards become
completely detached from psychological considerations. The meaning of “responsibility”
or “capacity” loses any connection with the psychological facts. In one possible example
from existingmedical law, EmmaCavehas argued that the test formental capacity applied
in the English case of E (awoman refusing treatment for anorexia nervosa)was impossible
to meet (Cave, 2014).8. Case study: 19th century American law
The role played by evaluative considerations in setting standards for
legal capacity, and tensions between the perceived importance of eval-
uative and psychological considerations, has a long history that is vivid-
ly illustrated in 19th century American law. In a rich historical study,
Susanna Blumenthal describes how political and moral commitments
played a profound role in determining the mental requirements for
legal capacity during this period (Blumenthal, 2007). Blumenthal argues
that a concept she calls the “default legal person”—broadly referring to
abilities for understanding, rational judgement and the ability to carry
out one's own purpose—underpinned attributions of legal capacity
throughout American law of the 1800s. However, her analysis shows
how social pressures were explicitly acknowledged as factors that
could legitimately constrain the shape of the default legal person in par-
ticular legal contexts.
Blumenthal describes how at the beginning of the 19th century, no-
tions of mental incapacity played little role in American law—psycho-
logical considerations were not considered relevant in questions of
legal capacity. The Enlightenment perspective of the time emphasized
the individual's ability to overcome mental weakness, and this was
combined with a strong concern for the preservation of America's de-
veloping ﬁnancial system.43 However, as the 19th century progressed,
the burgeoning ﬁeld of medicine became critical of what was increas-
ingly seen as an overly optimistic picture of human capacities to over-
come mental illness. Gradually, a new legal perspective emerged, “cast
in liberal humanist terms”which were felt appropriate for an indepen-
dent America, and mental ability became seen as essential to legal ca-
pacity (Blumenthal, 2007, p. 1166).
However, this transition played out in different ways in different
parts of the law. Blumenthal details how law concerning civil commit-
ment and guardianship initially saw a shift in the mid-1800s to a focus
on the well-being of the individual and those around him, which was
buttressed by a growing faith inmedicine. These factors raised themen-
tal threshold for legal capacity in this area of law. However, discontent
voiced by those emerging from interventions based on this raised
threshold—some of whombrought false imprisonment suits and sought
damages—turned the tide against this evaluative frame. In the second
half of the century the protection of patients' rights became paramount,
once again lowering the mental threshold for this kind of legal capacity
but this time for very different reasons than were given for the low
threshold at the beginning of the century.44
In the context of contract law, Blumenthal describes how over the
ﬁrst half of the 19th century the importance of preventing the ruin of
people who could not understand the contracts they entered was in-
creasingly emphasized, raising the threshold for competence to
contract.45 It was judged, however, that the threshold for the capacity
to make a will should remain low, and a number of justiﬁcations were
given for this position. In particular, the low threshold aimed to pre-
serve the testator's motivation to accumulate wealth, and to ensure
his family's motivation to care for him when the need came in his
later years.4643 For example by ensuring that contracts were upheld.
44 For example, one judge held that “nothing ought to bemore certain in the administra-
tion of the State's benevolence than that a sane person never passes behind the doors of its
asylums as a prisoner.” VanDeusen v. Newcomer, 40Mich. 90 (1897) at 137–8, as discussed
in (Blumenthal, 2007, p. 1201).
45 The essential standardwasdescribed as the ability “to see things in their true relations,
and to form correct conclusions” (Dennett v Dennett, 44 N.H. 531 (1863) at 538), and “to
transact business with intelligence, and an intelligent understanding of what he was do-
ing” (Hovey v Chase, 52 Me. 304, 315 (1863) at 316), as discussed in (Blumenthal, 2007,
p. 1224).
46 Instrumental reasons were also given for this low threshold. It was argued that less
“mind” is needed to execute awill because it is a topic that thepersonwill have considered
over their lifetime, and they will therefore already know their intentions, unlike making a
decision about a new business proposition (Blumenthal, 2007, p. 1206-7; 1234).
48 An example of this kind of argument was discussed in the case study of 19th century
American law in relation to the capacity to execute a will. See footnote 46.
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standard at the beginning of the 19th century, with the capacity to do
harm being sufﬁcient for liability (Blumenthal, 2007, p. 1178).
Blumenthal explains that this approach was justiﬁed, among other rea-
sons, on grounds that the person who suffered the loss was entitled to
compensation. But gradually the moral outlook in this context also
shifted to focus on the apparent injustice of holding a person who
could not have avoided the injury because of a mental incapacity, to
the same standards as a person with full mental powers. By the begin-
ning of the 20th century legal opinion had come around to the idea
that blameworthiness was a fundamental requirement of liability, and
that this required an opportunity to avoid the harm,whichmight some-
times be absent due to mental disability.
This historical window describes signiﬁcant shifts in thinking about
legal capacity, from psychological factors playing virtually no role and
legal capacity being determined almost entirely by evaluative consider-
ations; to the concept of mental abilities becoming recognized as a rel-
evant factor in questions of legal capacity; and then to various
attempts at balancing psychological and evaluative considerations.
Against this background, the recent calls for much wider recognition
of the legal capacity of peoplewithmental disabilities represent a return
to the early 19th century approach according to which psychological
considerations had little role to play—this timenot on the basis of an En-
lightenment faith in reason, or to encourage trust in the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, but on grounds of a commitment to the importance of
recognizing the personhood and promoting the personal growth and
ﬂourishing of people with mental disabilities. With this understanding
of these legal developments in hand, the ﬁnal section of the paper
returns to the question of the relationship between standards for legal
capacity in the context of personal decisions and criminal acts, in light
of the CRPD.
9. The CRPD and legal capacity in relation to personal decisions and
criminal acts
Understood very broadly, there are four possibilities for the relation-
ship between the two standards in question. Perhaps the least compat-
ible with the new thinking about mental disability in connection with
the CRPD is the possibility of equivalent, demanding mental require-
ments for legal capacity across both contexts. Such a position would
allow considerable scope forwithholding the recognition of legal capac-
ity on the basis of mental incapacity, both in relation to personal deci-
sions and criminal acts. The evaluative outlook that seems most likely
to underpin such a position today is a protective stance in relation to
people with mental disabilities, which might be explained in terms of
an intrinsic and signiﬁcant vulnerability. However, this way of under-
standing mental disabilities is deeply inconsistent with the conceptual
and evaluative frame of the CRPD.
A second possibility is that of a more demanding standard (or stan-
dards) for criminal responsibility than for the right to make one's own
personal decisions.47 This combination would allow more scope for
withholding blame and punishment on the basis of mental incapacity,
recognizing legal capacity more readily in the personal sphere. This is
one position that seems compatible with the evaluative commitments
found in the CRPD and surrounding literature. As set out earlier, the rea-
sons for such a position could appeal to the idea that the personal devel-
opment and ﬂourishing of people with mental disabilities is unlikely to
be promoted by low mental thresholds for criminal responsibility; or
perhaps to the idea that recognizing personhood ismuch less important47 If law concerning children is any indication, mental thresholds for criminal responsi-
bility are already lower relative to standards for legal capacity in the context of personal
decisions, making this an unlikely outcome.
Our intuitions here will depend to a signiﬁcant degree on evaluative features such as the
perceived seriousness of the criminal act and the personal choice in question. The four
broad approaches set out in this section assume that these other factors are being held
constant across the two legal contexts.in this context. Seemingly in support of this last possibility, the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities explains that legal capacity “acquires a
special signiﬁcance for personswithdisabilitieswhen theyhave tomake fun-
damental decisions regarding their health, education andwork” (2014: para.
8), omitting any reference to criminal responsibility. A further reason that
might be given in for this position is the much greater opportunity for
decision-making support in the context of personal decisions.
A different kind of justiﬁcation for this positionmight appeal to psy-
chological rather than moral or political reasons (though as I have sug-
gested, this kind of argument seems unavailable to those adopting a
strong interpretation of Article 12).48 It could be argued that acting re-
sponsibly in a social context requires mental abilities that go beyond
those that are necessary for acting (or deciding) in accordance with
one's own will and preferences, and that this provides a reason for
adopting a more demanding standard for criminal responsibility
(Craigie & Coram, 2013). However, this is an issue on which there
seems to be considerable disagreement and it is not clear how it could
be resolved. Lyons argues (and Keating seems to agree) that the mental
functions engaged in these tasks are essentially the same (Keating,
2007; Lyons, 2010). But it seems equally plausible to adopt the position
that understanding the norms of society is in fact a simpler task than de-
veloping the self-knowledge that is necessary for pursuing one's own
interests.49 The norms of society are omnipresent from childhood,
while coming to know oneself and developing one's own projects and
identity might be considered a much more difﬁcult task. Understood
in this way, competent choices in the personal sphere require more
mental maturity than acts in accordance with the criminal law.
A third possibility is that of amoreminimal standard for criminal re-
sponsibility than for legal capacity in the context of personal decisions.
This combinationwould allow for considerable interference in personal
decision-making on grounds of mental incapacity, but would make it
more difﬁcult to use mental incapacity as a basis for withholding or re-
ducing blame and punishment.50 This combination does not seem to ﬁt
well with the evaluative commitments found in the CRPD literature, but
a number of other moral orientations could be used to justify such a po-
sition. In particular, social conservatives are associated with being
“tough on crime” but also being committed to substantive views on
the value of life and health, which are used to argue for an intervention-
ist stance in the personal sphere. Cast in jurisprudential terms, Lyons
considers a similar justiﬁcation that, “the criminal justice system has a
responsibility to prosecutewrongdoing,while it seems the family courts
should err on the side of life rather than death.” (Lyons, 2010, p. 275).51
The underlying idea is that these two parts of the legal system are con-
stituted by fundamentally different values. Describing this in a study of
19th century English law, Ezra Hasson contrasts what she calls the “hu-
manitarian” values of the civil lawwith the “social” values of the crimi-
nal law (Hasson, 2010, pp. 17–18).
However, an alternative, unifying, explanation for this combination
of standards is that a fundamental commitment to the value of human
life and well-being—or perhaps a disvaluing of personal harm—pulls in
opposite directions in these two legal contexts. In questions of criminal
responsibility these commitmentsmean that a defendant'smental inca-
pacities have to be signiﬁcant to count as exculpating, particularly in the
context of crimes that involve serious personal harms such as a killing.
In the context of personal decisions, particularly decisions concerning
healthcare, these same values drive the mental threshold for legal49 I am indebted to the 2012–13 ‘Philosophy, Justice and Health’ graduate research sem-
inar group, and the 2014-15 ‘Profound Impairment’ graduate research seminar group in
the Department of Philosophy at University College London for their help in developing
this point.
50 For example, see Pickard on the approach to personality disorder in English law
(Pickard, 2015), and the situation for young people in English law as discussed above.
51 Lyons ultimately rejects this justiﬁcation on the basis of the arguments discussed
above.
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preserve life and well-being.
The ﬁnal broad possibility is that of equivalent, minimal standards in
both contexts. This is the second placewhere a proponent of wider legal
recognition for people with mental disabilities might position them-
selves, though the threshold endorsed will depend on how strongly Ar-
ticle 12 is interpreted. In justifying such a position it might be argued
that personhood considerations are much more weighty than personal
growth and ﬂourishing considerations; and that personhood consider-
ations offer equally strong reasons for recognizing legal capacity in rela-
tion to personal decisions and criminal acts. Alternatively (thoughmuch
less convincingly in my view), it might be argued that personal growth
and ﬂourishing considerations alsoweigh in favour ofwider recognition
of legal capacity in relation to criminal acts.10. Conclusions
It has been argued here that the essential role played by evaluative
considerations in setting functional standards for legal capacitymay jus-
tify asymmetry between these standards across one legal system. This
account of the role played by evaluative factors rejects the assumption
that legal capacity in the context of personal decisions and criminal
acts are two sides of the one coin; aswell as the corollary that a position
adopted in one context must automatically apply to the other.
The evaluative frame endorsed in the literature around the CRPD is
compatible with two broad possibilities: a more demanding mental
standard (or standards) for criminal responsibility than for the right to
make one's own personal decisions; and equivalent, minimal standards
in the context of both kinds of legal question. Proponents will no doubt
differ in their answers to the various moral questions posed in this
paper—Does an incapacity-based criminal defence undermine the rec-
ognition of personhood? Is the recognition of personhood equally im-
portant in these two legal contexts? Is it likely that assigning criminal
responsibility will be developmental for people with mental disabil-
ities?Which should be givenmoreweight: issues of personhood or per-
sonal development and ﬂourishing?—And differences in these answers
will deliver a different conclusions regarding the implications of the
CRPD for law concerning criminal responsibility.
It has been anunderlying purpose of this paper to examine the inter-
play between psychological and evaluative considerations in questions
of legal capacity; and to draw attention to how these two types of con-
sideration are being balanced in the developing literature around the
CRPD. Strong interpretations of Article 12 radically prioritize evaluative
over psychological considerations in questions of legal capacity. The
idea that justice limits the role that should be played by evaluative con-
siderations in setting these standards therefore presents a challenge to
such views. As lawmakers endeavour to respond to the CRPD, a critical
issue that deserves further investigation concerns why, as some propo-
nents claim, this construction of the relationship between evaluative
and psychological considerations is the one that should be pursued.Acknowledgements
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